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ABSTRACT

1.

We propose an approach to synthesize control protocols for
autonomous systems that account for uncertainties and imperfections in interactions with human operators. As an
illustrative example, we consider a scenario involving road
network surveillance by an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
that is controlled remotely by a human operator but also
has a certain degree of autonomy. Depending on the type
(i.e., probabilistic and/or nondeterministic) of knowledge
about the uncertainties and imperfections in the operatorautonomy interactions, we use abstractions based on Markov
decision processes and augment these models to stochastic two-player games. Our approach enables the synthesis
of operator-dependent optimal mission plans for the UAV,
highlighting the e↵ects of operator characteristics (e.g., workload, proficiency, and fatigue) on UAV mission performance;
it can also provide informative feedback (e.g., Pareto curves
showing the trade-o↵s between multiple mission objectives),
potentially assisting the operator in decision-making.

Autonomous systems are becoming increasingly prevalent
in today’s society. For example, artificial pancreas systems
have been used to help diabetes patients control blood sugar
levels; prototypes of driverless cars have been developed and
tested on public roads; and UAVs have been used for crop
dusting and weather monitoring. Despite the name, however, autonomous systems usually do not act in isolation;
rather, they often perform their intended functions at the
behest of a human operator who acts as either a supervisor or a collaborator, depending on the onboard autonomy’s designed purpose and level of sophistication. Numerous highly publicized incidents and accidents have underscored the need for taking into account operator-autonomy
interactions when designing an autonomous system. As an
example, in the Global Hawk incident [22], the UAV unexpectedly accelerated to a ground speed of 155 knots (under
the control of automated mission planning software) when
the operator commanded it to taxi at a speed of 6 knots;
the lack of proper coordination between the operator and
automation caused the UAV to eventually run o↵ the runway and crash. This issue has also recently been recognized by regulators. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration advised that the amount of time and state
of situational awareness needed by the operator to safely
retake manual control of a car from an automated state
should be considered in the design of driver-vehicle interfaces as well as in the development of operator training and
certification requirements [16]. The Federal Aviation Administration raised similar considerations for UAVs: for the
purpose of collision avoidance, interfaces must display information about the state of the UAV and nearby air traffic,
taking into account visual processing capabilities of the operator [9]. Indeed, vast amounts of data and literature from
human factors research are becoming available, which can
provide guidance for the design of autonomous systems.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.2 [Automatic Programming]: Program synthesis; I.2.9
[Robotics]: Operator interfaces; H.1.2 [User/Machine
Systems]: Human factors

General Terms
Verification, Human Factors
⇤ The authors are partially supported by James S. McDonnell Foun-

dation Postdoctoral Fellowship, ERC Advanced Grant AdG-246967
VERIWARE, OSD, AFRL, AFOSR grant # FA9440-12-1-0302,
AFOSR grant # 13RQ03COR and ONR grant # N000141310778.

INTRODUCTION

Reactive synthesis o↵ers a promising paradigm of approaches
to design correct-by-construction control protocols for autonomous systems. Given a model (e.g., transition system)
and a property specification (often expressed in temporal
logics) for an autonomous system, synthesis approaches can

automatically generate a protocol (or strategy) for controlling the system that satisfies or optimizes the property. Over
past decades, various reactive synthesis techniques have been
developed for the design of di↵erent types of autonomous
systems. A review of such techniques can be found in [23],
while some recent advances in synthesis for probabilistic systems are presented in [4] and [13]. These techniques have
been applied to real-world case studies such as UAV mission
planning [10] and autonomous urban driving [4].
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A key challenge for reactive synthesis is obtaining appropriate models of a human operator’s behavior and performance
with respect to operator-autonomy interactions. Work in
this area is still limited, and available models are not necessarily well suited to reactive synthesis. For instance, [15]
finds an upper bound on the number of autonomous vehicles a human operator can e↵ectively supervise, and [18]
derives task queueing policies the automation can employ to
optimize operator workload. However, these models are relatively abstract and do not capture the types of detailed operator decision-making behaviors we would like to consider
for reactive synthesis. A class of operator decision-making
models can be found in [20], but this class is limited to
tasks in which only two choices are available. Cognitive architectures have been used to model more complex operator
decision-making behaviors and performance characteristics
[21], but the resulting models are not expressed in a concise
mathematical framework amenable to reactive synthesis.
We therefore develop a hypothetical model of operator behavior and performance amenable to reactive synthesis based
on high-level trends induced from human factors literature.
For instance, data from [1] demonstrate that on a wide variety of tasks, “human reliability” or rate of human error often increases with higher levels of stress and decreases with
higher levels of operator proficiency; moreover, for vigilance
tasks that require detecting simple infrequent signals over
prolonged periods of time without rest, missed detections
tend to increase over time. Similar trends can be found in
other studies. One study of vigilance tasks found declining
response rates after as little as 3 minutes of task performance, with response rates eventually plateauing at 70-80%
of initial rates [14]. Di↵erences in task performance can
also vary between operators. For instance, a meta-analysis
of 53 studies concluded that introverts have better overall
performance than extraverts on visual detection tasks [11].
Operator performance on visual identification and classification tasks can also vary significantly in response times and
accuracy, e.g. due to di↵erences in age or experience [8].
Though a particular operator’s behavior may be unknown at
system design time, relevant statistics can be obtained, e.g.,
via extracting possible operator behavior patterns from prior
information such as training logs. Moreover, methods such
as cognitive task analysis [6] can be applied to reveal how
an operator would respond to various events. We expect advances in data-driven modeling to help create individualized
libraries of operator models and support on-demand controller synthesis as operators, missions, and vehicles change.
As an illustrative example for this paper, we consider a simple scenario involving road network surveillance by a UAV.
We first build abstractions for operator-autonomy interac-
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Figure 1: A road network for UAV ISR missions
(adapted from [10]).
tions based on Markov decision processes (MDPs), a widely
used model for discrete time stochastic control processes.
A (fully probabilistic) operator model is developed, taking
into account a rich set of human performance characteristics
(e.g., proficiency, workload, and fatigue), as previously mentioned. The operator-autonomy interaction is then modeled
as a product MDP from the composition of the operator
model and a UAV model. Given a mission objective, we can
synthesize an optimal UAV piloting plan that satisfies it via
finding a strategy in the MDP. If models for individual operators are available, we may even synthesize individualized
optimal UAV piloting plans. Moreover, if there are multiple
mission objectives, we can draw Pareto curves to help operators understand trade-o↵s. We also demonstrate the impact
of operator characteristics on UAV mission performance.
It may be beneficial to add nondeterminism in the operator model, e.g., for modeling human dynamic re-tasking of
UAVs to address previously unforeseen circumstances. To
distinguish the two di↵erent sources of nondeterminism from
the operator and the UAV, we augment the MDP models to
stochastic two-player games. The goal is to synthesize a winning strategy for the UAV (Player 1) against all strategies
(including the worst-case) of the operator (Player 2). This
separate role consideration is also useful in modeling design
decisions about function allocation (i.e., the assignment of
operator and autonomy to tasks). As with MDPs, we can
similarly synthesize individualized UAV strategies and analyze mission objective trade-o↵s with games. In addition, we
may guide the refinement of the admissible operating region
and provide informative feedback to operators for achieving
better mission performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the
motivating example in Section 2 and introduce formal specifications and models in Section 3. We present our modeling
approach and experimental results for MDPs and stochastic
two-player games in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
Finally, we remark on potential future work in Section 6.

2.

MOTIVATING EXAMPLE

As an illustration of synthesis for autonomous systems interacting with human operators, we describe two variants of
an example in which a remotely controlled UAV is used to
perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

missions over a road network. Figure 1 shows a map of the
road network, which has six surveillance waypoints labeled
w1 , w2 , . . . , w6 . Approaching a waypoint from certain angles
may be better than others, e.g., in order to obtain desired
look angles on a waypoint target using an ellipsoidal loiter
pattern. Angles of approach are thus discretized in increments of 45 around each waypoint, resulting in eight angle
points a1 , a2 , . . . , a8 around each waypoint. Roads connecting waypoints are discretized into road points r1 , r2 , . . . , r9 .
Red polygons represent “restricted operating zones” (ROZs),
areas in which flying the UAV may be dangerous or lead to
a higher chance of being detected by an adversary.
In current practice [5], at least two human operators are required for a UAV ISR mission: one to pilot the UAV, and
the other to steer the onboard sensor and interpret the sensor imagery. Here, we assume the UAV has a certain degree
of autonomy that is used to fulfill most of the piloting functions, e.g., maintaining loiter patterns around waypoints, selecting most of the points that comprise the route, and flying
the route. The human operator primarily performs sensor
tasks, e.g., steering the onboard sensor to capture imagery
of targets at waypoints. However, the operator also retains
the ability to a↵ect some of the piloting functions of the
UAV. In both variants of the scenario, the operator decides
how many loiters to perform at each waypoint, since more
loiters may be needed if the operator is not satisfied with
the sensor imagery obtained on previous loiters. Additionally, waypoints w2 , w5 and w6 in Figure 1 will be designated
as checkpoints. At checkpoints, the operator can directly
impact the choices made by the protocol we synthesize by
selecting di↵erent roads to be taken between waypoints. In
the second variant of this example, the operator may also
specify the angle of approach to surveillance waypoints.
In both cases, the optimal piloting plan for the UAV varies
depending on mission objectives. Specification patterns for
a variety of UAV missions are presented in [10], including
safety, reachability, coverage, sequencing of waypoints, etc.
We consider a few concrete examples here, e.g., surveillance
of the road network with minimum fuel consumption, or flying to certain waypoints while trying to avoid ROZs. Our
goal is to synthesize the optimal UAV piloting plan for a specific mission objective, which would be implemented by the
UAV’s onboard automation interface to control the route.
In particular, we would like to investigate how the uncertainties and imperfections of a human operator’s behavior
a↵ect the optimal UAV piloting plan. Specifically, what is
the influence of an operator’s proficiency, workload, and fatigue level on UAV mission performance? Can we synthesize
individualized optimal UAV piloting plans for di↵erent operators? Can the automation provide informative feedback
to operators to assist them in decision-making?
In the following, we introduce formal specifications and models to study the above questions. We discuss two di↵erent
models, one based on MDPs and the other on stochastic
two-player games, in order to abstract di↵erent types (e.g.,
probabilistic vs. worst-case) of prior knowledge about imperfections in the operator’s behavior and the interactions
(e.g., the operator’s interference in the choices made by the
autonomy protocol) between the autonomy protocols and
the operator.

3.

PRELIMINARIES

We use Q and R to denote the rationals and reals, respectively. A discrete probability distribution over
P a (countable)
set Q is a function µ : Q ! [0, 1] such that q2Q µ(q) = 1.
Let Dist(Q) denote the set of distributions over Q, ⌘q denote the point distribution on q 2 Q, and µ1 ⇥ µ2 denote the
product of distributions µ1 and µ2 .

3.1

Markov Decision Processes

Markov decision processes (MDPs) [17] are widely used for
modeling discrete time stochastic control processes whose
outcomes are partly random and partly decided by a controller. Formally, an MDP is a tuple M = hS, s, A, i where
S is a countable set of states, s 2 S is an initial state, A
is a set of actions, and ✓ S ⇥ A ⇥ Dist(S) is a transition
relation, assigning at most one distirbution per state and
def
action. Let A(s) = {a 2 A | 9µ 2 Dist(S) . (s, a, µ) 2 }
be the set of enabled actions at state s; for any state s 2 S,
a
A(s) 6= ;. A state s has a successor s0 , written s !s0 , if there
is an action a 2 A(s) such that (s, a, µ) 2 and µ(s0 ) > 0.
We sometimes write (s, a)(s0 ) to denote µ(s0 ). If there are
multiple actions in A(s), a nondeterministic choice needs to
be made. We call an MDP a discrete-time Markov chain
(DTMC) if A(s) is a singleton set for any state s 2 S.
An infinite path through an MDP M is a sequence of ala0
a1
ternating states and actions s0 !s
1 ! · · · . A finite path
⇢ is a prefix of an infinite path ending in a state, denoted
last(⇢). Let IPath s and FPath s denote the set of infinite
and finite paths starting from state s of M , respectively. Let
def S
def S
IPath = s2S IPath s and FPath = s2S FPath s . We use
a strategy to resolve the nondeterministic choices in an MDP,
which is defined formally as a function : FPath ! Dist(A)
such that (⇢)(a) > 0 only if a 2 A(last(⇢)). Under a particular strategy , the behavior of an MDP M is fully probabilistic, inducing a DTMC M (implicitly starting at s).
We can define a probability space over infinite paths IPath
of a DTMC, called the path distribution, in the standard
way. For each finite path ⇢ 2 FPath, the cylinder C⇢ is the
set of all infinite paths with prefix ⇢. Given a finite path ⇢ =
an 1
a0
a1
s0 !s
!sn , the probability measure of its cylin1 !···
def Q
1
der is defined as P(⇢) = n
i=0 (si , ai )(si+1 ). This measure
uniquely extends to infinite paths due to Carathéodory’s extension theorem. Given an MDP M and a strategy , we
denote by Pr s the resulting probability measure over all infinite paths (starting at state s) of the induced DTMC M .
We can also reason about the rewards (sometimes called
costs) of certain events happening in an MDP. We define
a reward structure as a function r : (S ⇥ A) ! Q, and
a0
a1
the total reward of an infinite path ⇢ = s0 !s
1 ! · · · as
PN
def
rew(r)(⇢) = limN !1 i=0 r(si , ai ), if the limit exists. The
expected total reward computes the expectation of rewards
accumulated along all the infinite paths IPath s starting at
the initial state s in an induced DTMC M , denoted by
def R
E [rew(r)] = ⇢2IPath rew(r)(⇢)dPr s (⇢). For example, we
s
can define a reward/cost structure based on how much fuel
a UAV uses during each (discrete) “fly” step and compute
the expected total fuel consumption of a mission.

A specification is a predicate on path distributions. For
example, E [rew(r)]  v is a specification requiring the expected total reward/cost of r, under an MDP strategy , to
be smaller than the bound v. We say that ' is achievable
in an MDP M if there is a strategy such that ' holds for
the induced DTMC M , written M |= '. A conjunctive
query (CQ) is a specification defined via the conjunction of
multiple objectives. For example, a CQ
E [rew(r1 )]  v1 ^ E [rew(r2 )]  v2
asks us to find a strategy
that minimizes both rewards/costs to achieve bounds v1 and v2 , resp., simultaneously.
Note that the quantification of strategies is over the entire
CQ, i.e., it is not sufficient to find one strategy for each objective in isolation. Moreover, a CQ does not have a single
achievable optimum; rather, it has several so-called Pareto
optima. The intuition is that a Pareto optimum for several
objectives cannot be improved in one dimension without degrading another dimension. For example, if (v1 , v2 ) = (4, 6)
is a Pareto optimum for the above CQ, then (4 ", 6) and
(4, 6 ") are not achievable for any " > 0. The set of all
Pareto optima is called the Pareto curve.
Given an MDP M and a specification ', the synthesis problem aims to find a strategy
in M such that M |= '.
For specifications consisting of a single objective, an optimal
strategy is one that achieves either the minimum or maximum value depending on the objective. For CQs about multiple objectives, e.g., for simultaneously minimizing several
expected total rewards/costs, we speak of (Pareto) optimal
strategies if they achieve a point above the Pareto curve.
The method of finding optimal strategies can vary for di↵erent types of specifications. For example, an optimal strategy
is obtained by choosing the locally optimal action in each
state for the minimum probability reachability in MDPs.
The strategy synthesis of CQs reduces to a linear programming problem and can be solved in polynomial time. We
refer to [13] for more details.
We often model parts of the system (e.g., the operator and
the UAV) separately, and obtain a model for the entire
system through composition. Formally, the composition of
two MDPs M1 and M2 yields another MDP M1 kM2 =
hS1 ⇥ S2 , (s1 , s2 ), A1 ⇥ A2 , i where the transition relation
is defined such that (s1 , s2 ), a, µ1 ⇥ µ2 2 i↵ one of
the following holds: (1) (s1 , a, µ1 ) 2 1 , (s2 , a, µ2 ) 2 2 and
a 2 A1 \ A2 ; (2) (s1 , a, µ1 ) 2 1 , µ2 = ⌘s2 and a 2 A1 \A2 ;
and (3) (s2 , a, µ2 ) 2 2 , µ1 = ⌘s1 and a 2 A2 \A1 . That
is, two MDPs are composed by synchronizing on common
actions and interleaving otherwise.
Models such as the ones we use in this paper represent an
abstraction of the scenario we are interested in, and di↵erent types of models allow abstractions to various levels and
types of detail. By modeling with MDPs, we choose an abstraction where all nondeterminism in the model is resolved
by either the operator or the UAV via a strategy. Since
we are interested in synthesizing UAV piloting plans (represented by strategies), we model that all nondeterminism is
resolved by the UAV strategy, and this strategy should not
influence the operator’s choices. Hence, in the MDP modeling, we assign probabilities to the choices the operator can
make in order to avoid nondeterminism wrongly resolved by

the UAV, assuming the availability of concrete probability
distributions constraining the possible operator behaviors.

3.2

Stochastic Two-Player Games

The previously mentioned restriction of MDPs (i.e., all nondeterminism is controlled by one strategy) can be relaxed by
modeling the scenario as a game between two players (i.e.,
the operator and the UAV), in which each player has a separate strategy to control di↵erent actions. Synthesizing an
optimal piloting plan requires finding a UAV strategy that
achieves the mission specification under any possible operator strategy, with the interpretation that we do not want to
constrain the operator’s behavior more than necessary.
We hence augment MDPs to stochastic two-player games (or
games) [19] by distinguishing two types of nondeterminism,
each controlled by a player. We use Player 1 to represent the
controllable part of a system for which we want to synthesize
a strategy and use Player 2 to represent the uncontrollable
environment. Formally, a game is defined as a tuple G =
hS, (S1 , S2 ), s, A, i where the set of states S is partitioned
into Player 1 states S1 and Player 2 states S2 , while the
initial state s, the action set A, and the translation relation
are defined exactly the same as in MDPs. Indeed, an
MDP can be considered as a special case of games, where
S = S1 and S2 = ;. A Player i strategy for i 2 {1, 2} is a
function i : FPath i ! Dist(A) where FPath i is the set of
finite paths ending in a Player i state. By fixing a strategy
for one player, a game becomes an MDP, while applying a
pair of strategies ( 1 , 2 ) of both players to a game G yields
a DTMC, denoted by G 1 , 2 . Thus, formalisms such as
probability measures and rewards can be defined for games
in a similar fashion as for MDPs. A Player 1 strategy 1 wins
a game G for a specification ' if G 1 , 2 |= ' for any Player 2
strategy 2 . The synthesis problem seeks to construct such
a winning strategy. For single-objective specifications, the
problem can be solved via a value iteration method [13].
For multi-objective synthesis, we compute successive underapproximations of the Pareto curves for Player 1 at each
state, from which we construct winning strategies [4].

3.3

Tools and Implementations

We build concrete scenario models and perform experiments
using the following tools. We use PRISM [12] for the modeling and synthesis of MDPs, use its extension named PRISMgames [2] for the strategy synthesis in stochastic games with
single objectives, and use the implementation of [4] for multiobjective synthesis in games.

4.

MDP FOR OPERATOR-AUTONOMY
INTERACTIONS

Consider the first variant of the scenario described in Section 2. Recall that at each waypoint, the operator steers
the sensors and decides if the UAV needs to continue loitering based on the quality of the captured sensor imagery,
which is under the influence of human performance characteristics such as proficiency, workload, and fatigue levels. At
checkpoints (i.e., w2 , w5 , and w6 ), the operator selects the
next road point for the UAV. Particular operator choices are
unknown at design time. If there exists sufficient prior information on possible patterns in operator choices, relevant
statistics may be obtained (e.g., from training logs), and
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Figure 2: A fragment of the operator model MOP ,
representing a possible operator’s behavior at the
waypoint w6 (with omitted parts drawn as · · · ).
a probabilistic model such as an MDP may be built as an
appropriate abstraction. In this section, we consider such
models and associated synthesis problems.

4.1

Modeling

The operator model. As discussed in Section 3.1, we
build abstractions of the operator’s possible behavior as a
fully probabilistic model MOP . Figure 2 shows a fragment
of the model, representing the possible behavior at the waypoint w6 . There is a non-negative integer variable k counting
the number of sensor tasks performed by the operator since
the beginning of the mission. The updates “k++” represent
the value of k increasing by one. The purpose of using k
in the model is to measure the operator’s fatigue level. To
obtain a finite state model, let the value of k stop increasing
once it reaches a certain threshold T (a constant that will
be used later in modeling fatigue).
In general, operators’ workload levels are driven by a number
of factors including mission characteristics, e.g., how many
UAVs the operator supervises simultaneously and the phase
of the mission. For simplicity and to reduce the complexity
of the models (so that the results discussed later are easier
to interpret), we model the operator’s workload as a uniform
distribution over two levels: low and high. Operators’ accuracy on vigilance tasks tends to decline with lower levels of
proficiency and higher levels of workload [1]. Moreover, one
study [14] finds that operators’ performance gets discounted
after a certain period of time, due to fatigue. Based on these
facts, we model an operator’s accuracy of steering sensors
to capture high resolution imagery of targets as probability distributions that correlate with proficiency, workload,
and fatigue. Specifically, when the operator’s workload level
is low, the probabilities of capturing good and bad quality
imagery are pl (k) and 1 pl (k), respectively. Here pl (k)
is a function over the variable k such that pl (k) = pl (0) if
k < T and pl (k) = f · pl (0) if k
T , where pl (0) is the
initial parameter value of the accuracy function, T is the fatigue threshold mentioned earlier and f is a fatigue discount
factor. The intuition is that, due to fatigue, the operator’s
accuracy gets discounted after performing certain number of
tasks. Analogously, we define the accuracy function ph (k)
for high workload. Note that pl (k) ph (k) for any k, modeling the fact that an operator tends to make more errors
under higher levels of workload and stress. Furthermore,
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Figure 3: A fragment of the UAV model MUAV , representing the UAV loitering and flying over the waypoints w6 and w5 .
more proficient operators have higher values for the accuracy parameters pl (0) and ph (0).
If the quality of the captured imagery is bad, the operator would ask the UAV to loiter at the current waypoint
in order to collect more sensor imagery; otherwise, the operator allows the UAV to fly to another waypoint. Since
w6 is a checkpoint, the operator selects the next road for
the UAV (at any non-checkpoint waypoint, the UAV controller chooses the road). We model the operator’s choices
as following a certain probability distribution, i.e., picking
the roads that connect to neighboring road points r2 , r3
and r8 with probabilities p, p0 and p00 , respectively (note
that p + p0 + p00 = 1). Such probability distributions may
be obtained using data-driven approaches. For example, we
may extract operator behavior patterns for generic classes of
checkpoints using human factors research methods such as
cognitive task analysis [6] and maintain a library of operatordependent behavior patterns. We can then instantiate the
probability distribution for a specific checkpoint in a map
by matching the operator behavior library statistics, e.g.,
at “three-way crossing with a bridge”-type checkpoints, the
operator chooses the bridge with probability 0.5.
The UAV model. We model the UAV’s piloting behavior
as an MDP MUAV , which contains 63 states (6 waypoints,
6⇥8 angle points, and 9 road points). At any waypoint or
road point, the UAV can nondeterministically fly to a neighboring angle point or road point. These nondeterministic
choices need to be resolved by a strategy. Figure 3 shows
a fragment of the model1 , illustrating how the UAV loiters
and flies over waypoints w6 and w5 . If the UAV receives a
loiter instruction from the operator, it loiters at the current
waypoint, allowing the operator to capture more sensor imagery; otherwise, the UAV randomly picks one of the eight
angle points a1 , · · · , a8 to exit w6 . Then, a nondeterministic
choice between three roads r2 , r3 and r8 needs to be resolved.
Suppose r3 is chosen by the operator; then the UAV can fly
to the waypoint w5 and approach it via one of the eight angles, or the UAV can also fly back to the waypoint w6 (for
clarity, this choice is not drawn in Figure 3).
The operator-autonomy interactions. We model the
interactions between the operator and the UAV by composing MOP and MUAV , which synchronize over common actions
1

Our models are shown with several distributions associated
with an action name but after composition this can easily
be resolved through renaming, and we obtain MDPs.

Minimum expected time

Minimum expected time

Fatigue discount factor

Figure 4: The e↵ect of operator fatigue on minimum
expected mission completion time, for di↵erent values of the fatigue threshold T and discount factor f
(with fixed parameters pl (0) = 0.9 and ph (0) = 0.8).
loiter and fly, and obtain a product MDP MOP kMUAV . Since
MOP is a DTMC and has no nondeterminism, synthesizing
a strategy for the MDP MOP kMUAV yields a strategy 0
0
for MUAV such that (MOP kMUAV ) = MOP kMUAV . The size
of the model depends on the model parameters (e.g., the fatigue threshold T ). In our experiments, the MDPs generally
have around 60, 000 states, while the PRISM tool [12] that
we use can handle up to 1010 states for MDPs.

4.2

Analysis

We present experimental results using the above MDP model.
In particular, we consider the following questions proposed
in Section 2: Does an operator’s fatigue, proficiency, and
workload level a↵ect UAV mission performance? Can we
synthesize individualized optimal UAV piloting plans for
di↵erent operators? Can we provide informative feedback
to operators to assist decision-making? Since we do not
have access to a real operator’s behavior data, our experiments are based on some fictional numbers. These parameter choices, however, are still consistent with the general
trends shown in a large body of literature on human factors
research as discussed earlier. Our primary goal is simply to
demonstrate the capabilities of our approach.
E↵ects of operator fatigue. We first consider the UAV
surveillance mission of covering all six waypoints in Figure 1.
The objective is to complete the mission as fast as possible.
Assume that each loiter takes 10 time units and flying between any neighboring waypoint and/or road point takes
60 time units. Figure 4 illustrates the influence of the operator’s fatigue threshold T and discount factor f on the
minimum expected time to complete the mission. The general trend is that the UAV completes the mission faster if
the operator has a higher fatigue threshold T (i.e., less likely
to get tired) or a larger value of f (i.e., the accuracy is less
discounted). The best UAV performance (i.e., the smallest
expected mission completion time) is achieved when f = 1,
that is, there is no accuracy discount due to fatigue.
E↵ects of operator proficiency and workload. The
operator’s accuracy in steering sensors and capturing good
quality imagery are a↵ected by proficiency and workload.
Figure 5 illustrates the influence of accuracy parameters
pl (0) and ph (0) on the minimum expected time of finishing
the mission (i.e., covering all six waypoints). The trends
show that a more proficient operator who has higher values
of pl (0) and ph (0) can complete the mission faster. In addi-

Figure 5: The e↵ect of operator proficiency and
workload on minimum expected mission completion
time, for di↵erent initial values of the accuracy functions pl (0) and ph (0) (with fixed parameters T = 10
and f = 0.7).
tion, the more accuracy declines due to high workload, i.e.,
the larger the gap between pl (0) and ph (0), the longer the
time needed to complete the mission.
Synthesizing individualized strategies. Suppose it is
possible to parameterize the model for individual operators,
e.g., using the operator-dependent behavior patterns library
as described in Section 4.1. Then, we can synthesize individualized optimal UAV piloting plans for di↵erent operators.
For example, consider the mission of covering waypoints w1 ,
w2 and w6 in Figure 1, with the UAV starting at w1 . The
objective is to minimize fuel consumption, where flying from
a waypoint or road point to a neighboring point costs the
UAV one unit of fuel (assume fuel consumption of loitering
is negligible). The operator’s choices at the checkpoints w2
and w6 are instantiated with probability distributions from
the (hypothetical) operator behavior patterns library as discussed earlier. Suppose there is a risk adverse operator who
exhibits the behavior pattern of always avoiding ROZs, and
the operator’s choices are instantiated as picking (with probability 1) r5 at w2 and r2 at w6 . The optimal UAV piloting
plan fulfills the mission objective with the following path:
w1 ! r 1 ! r 2 ! w6 ! r 2 ! r 1 ! w1 ! r 9 ! w2
costing 8 units of fuel. Suppose there is another operator
whose behavior pattern library shows a higher likelihood
of entering ROZs (e.g., due to the lack of training or not
being able to recognize the danger when operating under
high workload), and the choices are instantiated as picking
r7 at w2 and r3 at w6 . The synthesized optimal UAV piloting
plan yields the path:
w1 ! r9 ! w2 ! r7 ! r8 (roz1 ) ! w6
which only requires 5 units of fuel but flies through the ROZ.
Such individualized results generalize to truly probabilistic
operator models. In particular, the individualization would
be more obvious if we enhance the coupling of the operator’s
choice distributions and other operator characteristics such
as fatigue and workload.
Trade-o↵s between mission objectives. Interviews with
UAV domain experts [7] show there is a need for operators
to understand the risk associated with flying in certain conditions and the priority of mission objectives (e.g., get the
target and risk UAV survival). When there are multiple potentially conflicting mission objectives, conjunctive queries
for MDPs (see Section 3.1) can help to investigate the trade-

Figure 6: Pareto curves of two mission objectives
for various accuracy function parameters (L is pl (0)
and H is ph (0)), with fixed fatigue parameters T = 10
and f = 0.7.

Figure 7: Pareto curves of two mission objectives for
various values of the operator’s fatigue threshold T
and discount factor f , with fixed accuracy function
parameters pl (0) = 0.9 and ph (0) = 0.8.
o↵s. Suppose that the UAV mission is to cover waypoints
w1 , w2 and w6 . There are two objectives: (1) minimizing
the expected mission completion time, and (2) minimizing
the risk of being detected by an adversary (measured by
the expected total number of ROZ visits). Figure 6 shows
the Pareto curves of these two mission objectives for di↵erent initial values of the operator’s accuracy functions pl (0)
and ph (0). For a specific Pareto curve, any point in the area
(upward closure) above the curve (called a Pareto set) represents a pair of mission objective values that is achievable by
a UAV piloting strategy. For example, when pl (0) = 0.9 and
ph (0) = 0.8, the minimum expected time of completing the
mission is about 400 time units while the expected number
of ROZ visits is 0.75; on the contrary, the likelihood of ROZ
visits can be reduced to 0 if the mission completion time is
allowed to go up to at least 1,040 time units. Pareto curves
provide a useful visualization of trade-o↵s between di↵erent
mission objectives and can help the operator prioritize objectives. Once the operator selects a combination of mission
objective values from the Pareto set, a corresponding optimal UAV piloting plan can be automatically synthesized.
Di↵erent operators have di↵erent Pareto curves. Based on
an operator’s characteristics (e.g., how quickly one gets tired,
the tendency of making errors under a high workload), we
can predict the mission performance by drawing and comparing Pareto curves. For example, in Figure 6, the curves

Figure 8: Pareto curves of two mission objectives for
various probability distributions of operator choices
at checkpoints (e.g., pij is the probability of choosing
the direct route from waypoint wi to wj ), with fixed
parameters pl (0) = 0.9, ph (0) = 0.8, T = 10 and f = 0.7.
shift towards the right when the initial values of the accuracy
functions pl (0) and ph (0) decrease, representing an increase
in the mission completion time. Figure 7 shows the shift of
Pareto curves when varying values of the operator’s fatigue
threshold T and discount factor f , which is not as dramatic
as in Figure 6, indicating that the influence of fatigue parameters T and f may be less significant than that of the
accuracy function parameters pl (0) and ph (0). Figure 8 illustrates various Pareto curves for operators with di↵erent
probability distributions of route choices at the checkpoints.
The green lines (with dots) across Figures 6, 7 and 8 are
drawn with the same set of model parameters, serving as a
baseline for comparison. Figure 8 shows the most dramatic
(and irregular) shift of Pareto curves: it seems that, the
more likely it is that an operator chooses a route that visits ROZs (e.g., the route between the waypoints w2 and w6
overlapping with roz1 ), the more the Pareto curve shifts towards the upper-right (i.e., larger chances of entering ROZs,
and more compromises of the mission completion time are
needed in order to mitigate the likelihood of ROZ visits).

5.

STOCHASTIC GAMES FOR OPERATORAUTONOMY INTERACTIONS

It may be necessary to model the operator’s choices with
nondeterminism, instead of fixing all probability distributions as in the previous MDP models. In the following, we
model the operator’s choices of roads at any checkpoint and
of angles at any waypoint nondeterministically. Since there
are now two di↵erent sources of nondeterminism (i.e., from
the operator and the UAV), we augment the MDP models
to stochastic two-player games. We are interested in synthesizing an optimal piloting plan for the UAV, to react to any
choice of the operator. In other words, we are interested in
finding an admissible strategy for the UAV against all (potentially non-cooperative) strategies of the operator. While
we do not assume that the operator is adversarial, this competitiveness interpretation is appropriate when we are not
able, or willing, to place restrictions on the operator.

5.1

Modeling

Delegation of choices at checkpoints. In the MDP
models, the operator picks a road at each checkpoint for
the UAV with some predefined probability distribution. In

...

other words, synthesis for the UAV assumes that the operator’s choices follow this distribution. However, it may be
difficult to obtain and enforce such a distribution. Moreover, the operator may occasionally intervene to dynamically re-task the UAV to address unforeseen and unmodeled
situations, so we should put less constraints on the operator’s choices. Stochastic games allow the modeling of the
operator’s choices with nondeterminism, i.e., no assumption
on the distributions. If we let the operator have complete
power at checkpoints, the game semantics allow the operator to behave completely adversarially in worst-case scenarios. For example, the operator could ask the UAV to fly in
the loop w2 , w6 , w5 , w2 , w6 , . . . forever, resulting in the UAV
never being able to cover all the waypoints and complete
the mission. To avoid such unrealistic solutions, we define a
delegation probability, denoted pdel , with which the operator
delegates the UAV automation the task of picking the next
road. Imposing the delegation probability is a weaker assumption on the operator than a distribution on the actual
choices. Moreover, the delegation probability is not specific
to any particular map or mission, and thus is easier to quantify, e.g., by measuring how often an operator delegates to
the UAV automation during training or past missions.
Choices of the angle points. Previously, we modeled
with MDPs that the UAV automatically chooses which angle
to approach or exit a waypoint. By contrast, here we allow
the operator to select an angle point nondeterministically
at run time. This could be beneficial, because the operator
may have knowledge about the best angle to approach a
waypoint in order to capture high-quality sensor imagery.
The stochastic game model. Figure 9 shows a fragment
of our game model, in which states controlled by the UAV
and operator are drawn in circles and boxes, respectively.
After entering waypoint w6 , the UAV is ready for the operator to steer the sensors. The operator’s possible behavior of
capturing sensor imagery is modeled much as it was in the
MDPs. If the quality of the captured imagery is good, then
the operator nondeterministically chooses an angle for the
UAV to exit waypoint w6 . The red dashed circle highlights
how the operator delegates the UAV automation the task of
choosing roads based on the delegation distribution. With
probability pdel , the UAV takes control and picks the flying
route nondeterministically; otherwise, the route would be
decided by the operator.

5.2

Analysis

In the following, we report experimental results of applying
the game models to an example UAV mission of covering
waypoints w1 , w2 , and w6 (starting at w1 ). Assume each loiter takes 10 time units and flying each road segment takes 60
time units. We first investigate the minimum expected mission completion time, then analyze the trade-o↵s between
the likelihood of visiting ROZs and the mission completion
time. Note that our results represent the worst-case mission
performance under all strategies the operator could follow.
Expected mission completion time. Starting at waypoint w1 , the UAV automation chooses a road leading to
either w2 or w6 . Suppose the UAV flies to w6 first. Since
w6 is a checkpoint, after capturing good quality sensor imagery, with probability pdel the operator delegates the UAV
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Figure 9: A fragment of the game between the operator and UAV. States controlled by the UAV and
operator are drawn in circles and boxes respectively.
automation the authority to choose the next road; otherwise, with probability 1 pdel , the operator picks the next
road. As shown in Figure 9 (bottom), the operator may
pick any of r2 , r3 , and r8 nondeterministically, among which
only r8 leads directly to w2 (and the mission completes). If
the operator picks r2 or r3 , it takes the UAV more time
to eventually reach w2 and complete the mission. In the
game formulation, we synthesize the optimal UAV strategy
for all possible operator strategies, so we need to consider
the worst-case scenario in which the operator does not pick
the mission favorable choice r8 .
We plot the expected mission completion time as a function
of delegation probability in Figure 10. It shows a trend consistent with our previous analysis: the higher the delegation
probability (i.e., the less operator intervention), the faster
the mission can be completed. Moreover, we vary the values
of the operator fatigue discount factor f and observe that
the expected mission completion time decreases as the value
of f increases, which is consistent with the results reported
in Figure 4 for MDPs. The curves for di↵erent f values do
not intersect in Figure 10, because in the current model the
fatigue discount factor f only a↵ects the UAV loitering time
and is independent of the delegation probability.
Trade-o↵ analysis. As with MDPs, we can analyze the
trade-o↵s between multiple mission objectives by asking conjunctive queries in the game models. For example, consider
the query of minimizing the expected number of ROZ visits
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Figure 10: Expected mission completion time as a
function of delegation probability pdel and for various fatigue discount factor values f . The fatigue
threshold is set to T = 0.
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Figure 11: Pareto curves of two mission objectives
for various values of the delegation probability pdel .
We set pl (0) = 0.9, ph (0) = 0.8, T = 2 and f = 0.7.
and simultaneously minimizing the expected time of mission completion. Figure 11 shows the Pareto curves of these
two objectives, for di↵erent values of the delegation probability. The trends show that more visits to ROZs are expected in order to complete the mission more quickly and,
as the delegation probability decreases, longer missions result from mitigating the chances of entering ROZs. We also
change values of the operator accuracy parameters pl (0) and
ph (0) and plot the corresponding Pareto curves in Figure 12.
Note that, though we use the same set of accuracy parameter values as in Figure 6, a direct comparison of the results
is not possible, because here we set the delegation probability pdel = 0.1 whereas the results of Figure 6 are based
on specific probability distributions of operator choices at
checkpoints in the MDP models. Nevertheless, the general
trends of both Figures are consistent: that is, the higher
the operator accuracy, the less time needed to complete the
mission (because of less loitering).

5.3

Extensions

Admissible Operating Regions. It is a weaker assumption on the operator to model the choices with nondeterminism than with probability distributions. Therefore, the

UAV mission performance obtained in the game models is
poorer than that in the MDPs. For example, the expected
mission completion time is around 3,500 time units in the
game model (when the operator delegates no choice at checkpoints to the UAV, i.e., pdel = 0), whereas the time decreases significantly if we fix the operator’s distribution to
obtain an MDP (see Figure 6). In order to achieve better UAV performance, we may refine the game model by
strengthening assumptions on the operator. Consider a (hypothetical) checkpoint where the operator has choices of X,
Y, and Z. The fully nondeterministic model, shown in Figure 13 (left), allows the operator to pick any distribution
with a randomized strategy. We call such a set of distributions an admissible operating region (AOR) and represent it
graphically by the green triangle in Figure 13 (right). Each
corner point of an AOR corresponds to a worst-case distribution over the choices, either of a single operator repeatedly
entering the checkpoint corresponding to the AOR, or even
of a set of operators we wish to consider in our synthesis. In
Figure 13 (left), the AOR does not impose any constraints
on the worst-case distributions. An AOR is an assumption
placed on the operator behavior, and so, if a UAV plan is
synthesied using AORs, this plan depends on the operators’
behaviors staying with in the AOR. Note that in MDPs the
distributions of the operator are fixed, and hence represent
an AOR consisting of just a single point. Hence, a larger
AOR represents a weaker assumption on the operator behavior, making the synthesised UAV plans more robust against
unknown or changing operator behavior.
Directed game refinement. If we know about the possible distributions of the operator’s choices, we may refine
the model and obtain, for example, the one shown in Figure 13 (middle), where pi for i 2 {1, 2, 3} represent probability distributions (e.g., choosing X with probability xi ).
The corresponding AOR, drawn as the red triangle in Figure 13 (right), is more constrained than the green one, representing more restricted operator behavior and yielding better UAV mission performance. A directed game refinement
process involves the following steps: (1) determine an AOR
corner point that is the bottleneck for mission performance
through analyzing the game model; and (2) guide empirical
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Figure 13: The AOR of the operator modeled fully
nondeterministic (left) is endowed with learned distributions pi (middle), each of which corresponds to
a corner of the refined AOR (right).

analysis on possible operator behaviors and choices in order to improve the representative statistical model for the
AOR. This process of game analysis and distribution learning can be repeated until satisfactory mission performance
is obtained.
Other extensions. First, we can build into the model
a correlation between the delegation probability and other
operator characteristics such as workload and fatigue. For
example, we can model that the operator tends to delegate
to the UAV automation more often under higher workload
or fatigue levels. Modeling in such a way would increase
the coupling between the operator and the UAV, which is
useful in synthesizing individualized UAV piloting plans for
di↵erent operators. Second, we can synthesize specifications of the form 'A ! 'G using methods of [3], where 'A
represents assumptions on the operator and 'G represents
guarantees on UAV mission performance. Hence, instead of
explicitly encoding assumptions on the operator’s behavior
(e.g., via concrete probability distributions in the model),
we can use implicit assumptions/constraints expressed in the
specifications (e.g., temporal logics).

6.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, we present an approach to synthesize control
protocols for autonomous systems interacting with human
operators. Depending on the type (i.e., probabilistic and/or
nondeterministic) of knowledge about the uncertainties and
imperfections in the operator-autonomy interactions, we use
abstractions based on MDPs and augment these models to
stochastic two-player games. We demonstrate the influence
of operator characteristics (e.g., workload, proficiency, and
fatigue) on the mission performance. We also analyze the
trade-o↵s between multiple mission objectives via Pareto
curves. If models for individual operators are available, our
approach can even be applied to synthesize individualized
control protocols for di↵erent operators.
There are a few directions for future work. First, in addition to the extensions discussed in Section 5.3, we would like
to develop bigger and more representative models including
human factors (e.g., operator response time) beyond what
we have considered in this paper. For example, we may
incorporate uncertainties in the model parameters and consider richer operator interactions. Second, we would like to
consider a variety of application scenarios: for instance, the
distributed control of multiple UAVs by a single operator,

the loss of situational awareness of the operator, and limitations due to operator-autonomy interfaces. Last but not
least, we would like to build a library of data-driven models
for operators, which is a critical step towards personalized
on-demand controller synthesis.

7.
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